A simple proof of the completeness of APAL by Balbiani, Philippe & van Ditmarsch, Hans
ar
X
iv
:1
40
9.
26
12
v2
  [
cs
.L
O]
  1
0 S
ep
 20
14
A simple proof of the completeness of APAL
Philippe Balbiani∗ and Hans van Ditmarsch†
October 14, 2018
Abstract
We provide a simple proof of the completeness of arbitrary public announcement logic APAL. The
proof is an improvement over the proof found in [2].
1 Introduction
In [2] Arbitrary Public Announcement Logic (APAL) is presented. This is an extension of the well-
known public announcement logic [3] with quantification over announcements. The logic is axiomatized,
but the completeness proof may be considered rather complex. The completeness is shown by employing
an infinitary axiomatization, that is then shown to be equivalent (it produces the same set of theorems)
to a finitary axiomatization. The completeness proof in [2] contained an error in the Truth Lemma. The
lemma is as follows: Let ϕ be a formula in Lapal. Then for all maximal consistent theories x and for
all finite sequences ~ψ = ψ1, . . . , ψk of formulas in Lapal such that ψ1 ∈ x, . . ., [ψ1] . . . [ψk−1]ψk ∈ x:
Mc|~ψ, x |= ϕ iff [ψ1] . . . [ψk]ϕ ∈ x. The proof is by induction on ϕ. The problem is that in expression
Mc|~ψ, x |= ϕ, the restriction Mc|~ψ of the canonical model Mc cannot be assumed to exist: although
we have assumed that ψ1 ∈ x, . . ., and that [ψ1] . . . [ψk−1]ψk ∈ x, we did not assume that Mc, x |= ψ1,
. . . , and that Mc, x |= [ψ1] . . . [ψk−1]ψk. The latter would be needed to guarantee that existence. But the
induction was only on ϕ and not on ψ1, . . . , and [ψ1] . . . [ψk−1]ψk as well. This error has been corrected
in [1], by an expanding the complexity measure used in the Truth Lemma to include the formulas in the
sequence ψ1, . . ., [ψ1] . . . [ψk−1]ψk as well.
Another source of confusion in [2], although there was no error involved, concerned the employment of
maximal consistent theories (instead of maximal consistent sets, a more common term in modal logic), and
a number of properties shown for maximal consistent theories. While repairing the completeness proof,
and while also considering additional properties of the canonical model, we found another completeness
proof, that the reader may consider more direct and more elegant than the one in [2, 1]. This is presented
in this work, including some further results for the canonical model.
2 Syntax
Let Atm be a countable set of atoms (with typical members denoted p, q, etc) and Agt be a countable set
of agents (with typical members denoted a, b, etc).
Definition 1 (Language of APAL) The set Lapal of all formulas (with typical members denoted ϕ, ψ, etc)
is inductively defined as follows:
• ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∨ ψ) | Kaϕ | [ϕ]ψ | ✷ϕ.
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We define the other Boolean constructs as usual. The formulas Kˆaϕ, 〈ϕ〉ψ and ✸ϕ are obtained as abbre-
viations: Kˆaϕ for¬Ka¬ϕ, 〈ϕ〉ψ for¬[ϕ]¬ψ and✸ϕ for ¬✷¬ϕ. We adopt the standard rules for omission
of the parentheses. Given a formula ϕ, the set of all subformulas of ϕ is denoted by Sub(ϕ) (an elemen-
tary inductive definition is omitted). We will say that a formula ϕ is ✷-free iff Sub(ϕ) ∪ {ϕ} contains no
formula of the form ✷ψ. A formula ϕ is said to be [·]-free iff Sub(ϕ) ∪ {ϕ} contains no formula of the
form [ψ]χ. We will say that a formula ϕ is epistemic iff ϕ is both ✷-free and [·]-free. The set Lpal is the
set of all ✷-free formulas. The set Lel is the set of all epistemic formulas.
Of crucial importance in the completeness proof is a proper complexity measure on formulas. The one
we need is based on a partial order <Size providing a weighted count of the number of symbols, and on a
partial order <d✷ counting the number of stacked ✷ operators in a formula.
Definition 2 (Size) The size of a formula ϕ, in symbols Size(ϕ), is the non-negative integer inductively
defined as follows:
• Size(p) = 1,
• Size(⊥) = 1,
• Size(¬ϕ) = Size(ϕ) + 1,
• Size(ϕ ∨ ψ) = Size(ϕ) + Size(ψ) + 1,
• Size(Kaϕ) = Size(ϕ) + 1,
• Size([ϕ]ψ) = Size(ϕ) + 3 · Size(ψ),
• Size(✷ϕ) = Size(ϕ) + 1.
The ✷-depth of a formula ϕ, in symbols d✷(ϕ), is the non-negative integer inductively defined as follows:
• d✷(p) = 0,
• d✷(⊥) = 0,
• d✷(¬ϕ) = d✷(ϕ),
• d✷(ϕ ∨ ψ) = max{d✷(ϕ), d✷(ψ)},
• d✷(Kaϕ) = d✷(ϕ),
• d✷([ϕ]ψ) = max{d✷(ϕ), d✷(ψ)},
• d✷(✷ϕ) = d✷(ϕ) + 1.
We define the binary relations <Size, <d✷ , and <Sized✷ between formulas in the following way:
• ϕ <Size ψ iff Size(ϕ) < Size(ψ).
• ϕ <d✷ ψ iff d✷(ϕ) < d✷(ψ).
• ϕ <Sized✷ ψ iff either d✷(ϕ) < d✷(ψ), or d✷(ϕ) = d✷(ψ) and Size(ϕ) < Size(ψ).
The next two lemmas combine a number of results on these binary relations. Their proofs are obvious and
have been omitted.
Lemma 1 Let ϕ, ψ be formulas.
• <Size is a well-founded strict partial order between formulas.
• <d✷ is a well-founded strict partial order between formulas.
• <Sized✷ is a well-founded strict partial order between formulas.
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• If ϕ <Sub ψ then ϕ <Size ψ.
• If ϕ <Sub ψ then ϕ <Sized✷ ψ.
• If ϕ is epistemic, then d✷(ϕ) = 0.
• If ψ is epistemic, then [ψ]ϕ <Sized✷ ✷ϕ.
Lemma 2 Let ϕ, ψ, χ be formulas and a ∈ Agt.
1. ¬[ϕ]ψ <Size [ϕ]¬ψ,
2. Ka[ϕ]ψ <Size [ϕ]Kaψ,
3. [¬[ϕ]¬ψ]χ <Size [ϕ][ψ]χ.
The relation <Size has been tailored in order to ensure exactly the properties of Lemma 2. Without
the curious factor 3 in Size([ϕ]ψ) = Size(ϕ) + 3 · Size(ψ) these properties would not hold. Given the
previous lemmas, we can now list all the cases later used in the Truth Lemma.
Corollary 1 In cases (∗) and (∗∗), ϕ is epistemic.
ϕ <Sized✷ ¬ϕ ϕ <
Size
d✷
[ϕ]p ϕ <Sized✷ [ϕ]Kaψ
ϕ <Sized✷ ϕ ∨ ψ ϕ <
Size
d✷
[ϕ]⊥ Ka[ϕ]ψ <
Size
d✷
[ϕ]Kaψ
ψ <Sized✷ ϕ ∨ ψ ϕ <
Size
d✷
[ϕ]¬ψ [¬[ϕ]¬ψ]χ <Sized✷ [ϕ][ψ]χ
ϕ <Sized✷ Kaϕ [ϕ]ψ <
Size
d✷
[ϕ]¬ψ [χ][ϕ]ψ <Sized✷ [χ]✷ψ (∗∗)
(∗) [ϕ]ψ <Sized✷ ✷ψ [ϕ]ψ <
Size
d✷
[ϕ](ψ ∨ χ)
[ϕ]χ <Sized✷ [ϕ](ψ ∨ χ)
Definition 3 (Necessity form) Now, let us consider a new atom denoted ♯. The set NF of necessity forms
(with typical members denoted ξ(♯), ξ′(♯), etc) is inductively defined as follows—where ϕ is a formula.
• ξ(♯) ::= ♯ | ϕ→ ξ(♯) | Kaξ(♯) | [ϕ]ξ(♯).
3 Semantics
We introduce the structures and give a semantics for the logical language on these structures. The material
in this section (as also the logical language in the previous section, and the axiomatization in the next
section) is as in [2].
Definition 4 (Model) A model M = (W,R, V ) consists of a nonempty domain W , an accessibility func-
tion R : Agt → P(W ×W ) associating to each a ∈ Agt an equivalence relation R(a) on W , and a
valuation function V : Atm→ P(W ) — where V (p) denotes the valuation of atom p. For R(a), we write
Ra.
Definition 5 (Semantics) Assume a modelM = (W,R, V ). We inductively define the truth set ‖ ϕ ‖M.
w ∈ ‖ p ‖M iff w ∈ V (p)
w ∈ ‖ ¬ϕ ‖M iff w 6∈ ‖ ϕ ‖M
w ∈ ‖ ϕ ∨ ψ ‖M iff w ∈ ‖ ϕ ‖M or w ∈ ‖ ψ ‖M
w ∈ ‖ Kaϕ ‖
M iff for all v,Ra(w, v) implies v ∈ ‖ ϕ ‖M
w ∈ ‖ [ϕ]ψ ‖M iff w ∈ ‖ ϕ ‖M implies w ∈ ‖ ψ ‖Mϕ
w ∈ ‖ ✷ψ ‖M iff for all epistemic ϕ,w ∈ ‖ [ϕ]ψ ‖M
where modelMϕ = (W ′, R′, V ′) is such that
W ′ = ‖ ϕ ‖M,
R′a = Ra ∩ (‖ ϕ ‖
M × ‖ ϕ ‖M),
V ′(p) = V (p)∩ ‖ ϕ ‖M .
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4 Axiomatization
An axiomatic system consists of a collection of axioms and a collection of inference rules. Let us consider
the following axiomatic system:
Definition 6 (AxiomatizationAPAL) (A0) all instantiations of propositional tautologies,
(A1) Ka(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kaϕ→ Kaψ),
(A2) [ϕ](ψ → χ)→ ([ϕ]ψ → [ϕ]χ),
(A3) ✷(ϕ→ ψ)→ (✷ϕ→ ✷ψ),
(A4) Kaϕ→ ϕ,
(A5) Kaϕ→ KaKaϕ,
(A6) ϕ→ KaKˆaϕ,
(A7) [ϕ]p↔ (ϕ→ p),
(A8) [ϕ]⊥ ↔ ¬ϕ,
(A9) [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ→ ¬[ϕ]ψ),
(A10) [ϕ](ψ ∨ χ)↔ [ϕ]ψ ∨ [ϕ]χ,
(A11) [ϕ]Kaψ ↔ (ϕ→ Ka[ϕ]ψ),
(A12) [ϕ][ψ]χ↔ [〈ϕ〉ψ]χ,
(A13) if ψ is epistemic, then ✷ϕ→ [ψ]ϕ,
(R0) ({ϕ, ϕ→ ψ}, ψ),
(R1) ({ϕ},Kaϕ),
(R2) ({ϕ}, [ψ]ϕ),
(R3) ({ϕ},✷ϕ),
(R4) ({ξ([ψ]ϕ): ψ is epistemic}, ξ(✷ϕ)).
Let APAL be the least subset of Lapal containing (A0)–(A13) and closed under (R0)–(R4). An element
of APAL is called a theorem.
In [2] other (finitary) axiomatizations are also given, that are then shown to be equivalent to APAL (they
define the same set of theorems as APAL). For the completeness proof, we have chosen the most conve-
nient form, with the infinitary rule (R4). Some of the axioms and rules in the axiomatization APAL are
derivable from the other axioms and rules, again, see [2] for details. It concerns the following rules and
axioms (where ⊥ should be seen as the abbreviation of p ∧ ¬p):
(A3) ✷(ϕ→ ψ)→ (✷ϕ→ ✷ψ);
(A8) [ϕ]⊥ ↔ ¬ϕ;
(R3) ({ϕ},✷ϕ).
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5 Canonical model
Definition 7 (Theory) A set x of formulas is called a theory iff it satisfies the following conditions:
• x contains APAL,
• x is closed under (R0) and (R4).
A theory x is said to be consistent iff ⊥ 6∈ x. A set x of formulas is maximal iff for all formulas ϕ, ϕ ∈ x
or ¬ϕ ∈ x.
Obviously, the smallest theory is APAL whereas the largest theory is Lapal. The only inconsistent theory
is Lapal. The reader may easily verify that a theory x is consistent iff for all formulas ϕ, ϕ 6∈ x or ¬ϕ 6∈ x.
Moreover, for all maximal consistent theories x,
• ⊥ 6∈ x,
• ¬ϕ ∈ x iff ϕ 6∈ x,
• (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ x iff ϕ ∈ x or ψ ∈ x.
Theories are closed under (R0) and (R4) but not under the derivation rules (R1), (R2), and (R3) for a
specific reason. Obviously, by definition, all derivation rules preserve theorems. Semantically, we could
say that they all preserve validities. Now, unlike (R1), (R2), and (R3), the derivation rules (R0) and
(R4) also preserve truths. That is the reason! In the setting of our axiomatization based on the infinitary
rule (R4), we will say that a set x of formulas is consistent iff there exists a consistent theory y such
that x ⊆ y. Obviously, maximal consistent theories are maximal consistent sets of formulas. Under the
given definition of consistency for sets of formulas, maximal consistent sets of formulas are also maximal
consistent theories.
Definition 8 For all formulas ϕ and for all a ∈ Agt, let
x+ ϕ = {ψ : ϕ→ ψ ∈ x},
Kax = {ϕ : Kaϕ ∈ x}
[ϕ]x = {ψ : [ϕ]ψ ∈ x}.
The proofs of the following lemmas can be found in [2] (Lemmas 4.11 and 4.12).
Lemma 3 Let ϕ be a formula and a ∈ Agt. For all theories x,
• x+ ϕ is a theory containing x and ϕ,
• [ϕ]x is a theory,
• Kax is a theory.
Lemma 4 Let ϕ be a formula. For all theories x, x+ ϕ is consistent iff ¬ϕ 6∈ x.
Lemma 5 Each consistent theory can be extended to a maximal consistent theory.
The proof of the next lemma uses axioms (A4)–(A6).
Lemma 6 Let a ∈ Agt. For all maximal consistent theories x, y, z,
• Kax ⊆ x,
• if Kax ⊆ y and Kay ⊆ z, then Kax ⊆ z,
• if Kax ⊆ y, then Kay ⊆ x.
Next lemma is usually called “Diamond Lemma”. Its proof is very classical and uses Lemmas 3, 4 and 5.
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Lemma 7 Let ϕ be a formula and a ∈ Agt. For all theories x, if Kaϕ 6∈ x, then there exists a maximal
consistent theory y such that Kax ⊆ y and ϕ 6∈ y.
The next three lemmas were not found in [2].
Lemma 8 Let ϕ be a formula. For all maximal consistent theories x, if ϕ ∈ x, then [ϕ]x is a maximal
consistent theory.
Proof Suppose ϕ ∈ x. If [ϕ]x is not consistent, then ⊥ ∈ [ϕ]x. Hence, [ϕ]⊥ ∈ x. Thus, ¬ϕ ∈ x. Since
x is consistent, ϕ 6∈ x: a contradiction. If [ϕ]x is not maximal, then there exists a formula ψ such that
ψ 6∈ [ϕ]x and ¬ψ 6∈ [ϕ]x. Therefore, [ϕ]ψ 6∈ x and [ϕ]¬ψ 6∈ x. Since x is maximal, ¬[ϕ]ψ ∈ x and
¬[ϕ]¬ψ ∈ x. Consequently, ¬([ϕ]ψ ∨ [ϕ]¬ψ) ∈ x. Hence, using (A10), ¬[ϕ](ψ ∨ ¬ψ) ∈ x. Since x is
consistent, [ϕ](ψ ∨ ¬ψ) 6∈ x. Since ψ ∨ ¬ψ ∈ APAL, [ϕ](ψ ∨ ¬ψ) ∈ APAL. Thus, [ϕ](ψ ∨ ¬ψ) ∈ x: a
contradiction. ⊣
Lemma 9 Let ϕ, ψ be formulas. For all maximal consistent theories x, 〈ϕ〉ψ ∈ x iff ϕ ∈ x and ψ ∈ [ϕ]x.
Proof (⇒) Suppose 〈ϕ〉ψ ∈ x. Hence, 〈ϕ〉⊤ ∈ x. Thus, using (A8), ϕ ∈ x. By Lemma 8, [ϕ]x is a
maximal consistent theory. Suppose ψ 6∈ [ϕ]x. Since [ϕ]x is maximal, ¬ψ ∈ [ϕ]x. Therefore, [ϕ]¬ψ ∈ x.
Consequently, ¬〈ϕ〉ψ ∈ x. Since x is consistent, 〈ϕ〉ψ 6∈ x: a contradiction.
(⇐) Suppose ϕ ∈ x and ψ ∈ [ϕ]x. By Lemma 8, [ϕ]x is a maximal consistent theory. Suppose 〈ϕ〉ψ 6∈ x.
Since x is maximal, ¬〈ϕ〉ψ ∈ x. Hence, [ϕ]¬ψ ∈ x. Thus, ¬ψ ∈ [ϕ]x. Since [ϕ]x is consistent, ψ 6∈ [ϕ]x:
a contradiction. ⊣
Lemma 10 Let ϕ be a formula and a ∈ Agt. For all theories x, if ϕ ∈ x, then Ka[ϕ]x = [ϕ]Kax.
Proof Suppose ϕ ∈ x. For all formulas ψ, the reader may easily verify that the following conditions are
equivalent:
1. ψ ∈ Ka[ϕ]x,
2. Kaψ ∈ [ϕ]x,
3. [ϕ]Kaψ ∈ x,
4. ϕ→ Ka[ϕ]ψ ∈ x,
5. Ka[ϕ]ψ ∈ x,
6. [ϕ]ψ ∈ Kax,
7. ψ ∈ [ϕ]Kax.
⊣
Definition 9 (Canonical model) The canonical modelMc = (W c, Rc, V c) is defined as follows:
• W c is the set of all maximal consistent theories;
• Rc is the function assigning to each agent a the binary relation Rca on W c defined as
xRcay iff Kax ⊆ y;
• V c is the function assigning to each atom p the subset V c(p) of W c defined as
x ∈ V c(p) iff p ∈ x.
It will be clear that the canonical model is a model according to Definition 4. By Lemma 5, W c is a
non-empty set, and by Lemma 6 the binary relation Rc(a) is an equivalence relation on W c for each agent
a.
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6 Completeness
The main result of this Section is the proof of APAL’s Truth Lemma (Lemma 12). This proof is different
from and simpler than the proof presented in [2].
Definition 10 Let ϕ be a formula. Condition P (ϕ) is defined as follows.
For all maximal consistent theories x, ϕ ∈ x iff x ∈ ‖ ϕ ‖Mc .
Condition H(ϕ) is defined as follows.
For all formulas ψ, if ψ <Sized✷ ϕ, then P (ψ).
Our new proof of APAL’s Truth Lemma is done by using an <Sized✷ -induction on formulas. More
precisely, we will demonstrate that
Lemma 11 For all formulas ϕ, if H(ϕ), then P (ϕ).
Proof Suppose H(ϕ). Let x be a maximal consistent theory. We consider the following 13 cases.
Case ϕ = p. P (p) holds, as p ∈ x iff x ∈ ‖ p ‖Mc , by the definition of the canonical model and the
semantics of propositional atoms.
Case ϕ = ⊥. P (⊥) holds, as ⊥ 6∈ x and x 6∈ ‖ ⊥ ‖Mc , by the definition of the canonical model and the
semantics of ⊥.
Case ϕ = ¬ψ. The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent. The induction
using <Sized✷ is used between step 2. and step 3. A similar inductive argument is also used in all following
cases.
1. ¬ψ ∈ x,
2. ψ 6∈ x,
3. x 6∈ ‖ ψ ‖Mc ,
4. x ∈ ‖ ¬ψ ‖Mc .
Hence, ¬ψ ∈ x iff x ∈ ‖ ¬ψ ‖Mc .
Case ϕ = ψ ∨ χ. The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent:
1. ψ ∨ χ ∈ x,
2. ψ ∈ x, or χ ∈ x,
3. x ∈ ‖ ψ ‖Mc , or x ∈ ‖ χ ‖Mc ,
4. x ∈ ‖ ψ ∨ χ ‖Mc .
Hence, ψ ∨ χ ∈ x iff x ∈ ‖ ψ ∨ χ ‖Mc .
Case ϕ = Kaψ. The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent. The implication
from step 2. to step 1. is by Lemma 7.
1. Kaψ ∈ x,
2. for all maximal consistent theories y, if Kax ⊆ y, then ψ ∈ y,
3. for all maximal consistent theories y, if xRc(a)y, then y ∈ ‖ ψ ‖Mc ,
4. x ∈ ‖ Kaψ ‖M
c
.
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Hence, Kaψ ∈ x iff x ∈ ‖ Kaψ ‖M
c
.
Case ϕ = [ψ]p. The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent. Between step 1.
and step 2., use axiom (A7) [ψ]p↔ (ψ → p), so that [ψ]p ∈ x iff ψ → p ∈ x (similar justifications apply
in the other cases of form [ψ]χ).
1. [ψ]p ∈ x,
2. ψ 6∈ x, or p ∈ x,
3. x 6∈ ‖ ψ ‖Mc , or x ∈ ‖ p ‖Mc ,
4. x ∈ ‖ [ψ]p ‖Mc .
Hence, [ψ]p ∈ x iff x ∈ ‖ [ψ]p ‖Mc .
Case ϕ = [ψ]⊥. The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent:
1. [ψ]⊥ ∈ x,
2. ψ 6∈ x,
3. x 6∈ ‖ ψ ‖Mc ,
4. x ∈ ‖ [ψ]⊥ ‖Mc .
Hence, [ψ]⊥ ∈ x iff x ∈ ‖ [ψ]⊥ ‖Mc .
Case ϕ = [ψ]¬χ. The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent. In the crucial
equivalence between step 2. and 3. we use that ¬[ψ]χ <Sized✷ [ψ]¬χ, a consequence of Lemma 2 (the d✷
depth is the same for both formulas).
1. [ψ]¬χ ∈ x,
2. ψ 6∈ x, or ¬[ψ]χ ∈ x,
3. x 6∈ ‖ ψ ‖Mc , or x ∈ ‖ ¬[ψ]χ ‖Mc ,
4. x ∈ ‖ [ψ]¬χ ‖Mc .
Hence, [ψ]¬χ ∈ x iff x ∈ ‖ [ψ]¬χ ‖Mc .
Case ϕ = [ψ](χ ∨ θ). The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent:
1. [ψ](χ ∨ θ) ∈ x,
2. [ψ]χ ∈ x, or [ψ]θ ∈ x,
3. x ∈ ‖ [ψ]χ ‖Mc , or x ∈ ‖ [ψ]θ ‖Mc
4. x ∈ ‖ [ψ](χ ∨ θ) ‖Mc .
Hence, [ψ](χ ∨ θ) ∈ x iff x ∈ ‖ [ψ](χ ∨ θ) ‖Mc .
Case ϕ = [ψ]Kaχ. The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent (again, a
crucial step is between 2. and 3. where we can use induction on Ka[ψ]χ because of Lemma 2):
1. [ψ]Kaχ ∈ x,
2. ψ 6∈ x, or Ka[ψ]χ ∈ x,
3. x 6∈ ‖ ψ ‖Mc , or x ∈ ‖ Ka[ψ]χ ‖M
c
,
4. x ∈ ‖ [ψ]Kaχ ‖M
c
.
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Hence, [ψ]Kaχ ∈ x iff x ∈ ‖ [ψ]Kaχ ‖M
c
.
Case ϕ = [ψ][χ]θ. The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent (and once
more, a crucial step is between 2. and 3. where we use Lemma 2):
1. [ψ][χ]θ ∈ x,
2. [¬[ψ]¬χ]θ ∈ x,
3. x ∈ ‖ [¬[ψ]¬χ]θ ‖Mc ,
4. x ∈ ‖ [ψ][χ]θ ‖Mc .
Hence, [ψ][χ]θ ∈ x iff x ∈ ‖ [ψ][χ]θ ‖Mc .
Case ϕ = [ψ]✷χ. The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent. Between 1.
and 2., we use derivation rule (R4) on the necessity form [ψ][θ]χ and closure of maximal consistent sets
under (R4). Between step 2. and step 3. we use the complexity measure <Sized✷ , where we now simply
observe that [ψ]✷χ contains one ✷ less than [ψ][θ]χ. Between step 3. and step 4., we use the semantics of
arbitrary announcements✷ and of announcements [ψ]: we note that x ∈ ‖ [ψ][θ]χ ‖Mc is by the semantics
equivalent to: x ∈ ‖ ψ ‖Mc implies x ∈ ‖ [θ]χ ‖(Mc)ψ .
1. [ψ]✷χ ∈ x,
2. for all epistemic formulas θ, [ψ][θ]χ ∈ x,
3. for all epistemic formulas θ, x ∈ ‖ [ψ][θ]χ ‖Mc ,
4. x ∈ ‖ [ψ]✷χ ‖Mc .
Hence, [ψ]✷χ ∈ x iff x ∈ ‖ [ψ]✷χ ‖Mc .
Case ϕ = ✷ψ. The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent. The equivalence
between step 2. and step 3. follows from the fact that for all epistemic formulas χ, [χ]ψ <Sized✷ ✷ψ.
1. ✷ψ ∈ x,
2. for all epistemic formulas χ, [χ]ψ ∈ x,
3. for all epistemic formulas χ, x ∈ ‖ [χ]ψ ‖Mc ,
4. x ∈ ‖ ✷ψ ‖Mc .
Hence, ✷ψ ∈ x iff x ∈ ‖ ✷ψ ‖Mc . ⊣
Lemma 12 (Truth Lemma) Let ϕ be a formula. For all maximal consistent theories x,
• ϕ ∈ x iff x ∈ ‖ ϕ ‖Mc .
Proof By Lemma 11, using the well-foundedness of the strict partial order <Sized✷ between formulas. ⊣
Now, we are ready to prove the completeness of APAL.
Proposition 1 For all formulas ϕ, if ϕ is valid, then ϕ ∈ APAL.
Proof Suppose ϕ is valid and ϕ 6∈ APAL. By Lemmas 3, 4 and 5, there exists a maximal consistent
theory x containing ¬ϕ. By Lemma 12, x ∈ ‖ ¬ϕ ‖Mc . Thus, x 6∈ ‖ ϕ ‖Mc . Therefore, ‖ ϕ ‖Mc 6= W c.
Consequently, ϕ is not valid: a contradiction. ⊣
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7 Conclusion
We have provided an alternative, simpler, completeness proof for the logicAPAL. The proof is considered
simpler, because in the crucial Truth Lemma we do not need to take finite sequences of announcements
along. Instead, it can proceed by <Sized✷ -induction on formulas. We consider this result useful, as the com-
pleteness proofs of various other logics employing arbitrary announcements or other forms of quantifiying
over announcements may thus also be simplified, and as it may encourage the developments of novel log-
ics with quantification over announcements. We acknowledge useful discussions on the completeness of
APAL with Jie Fan, Wiebe van der Hoek, and Barteld Kooi.
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